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The expansion of legalized gambling opportunities in North America and elsewhere has 
proceeded rapidly since the early 1990s, and the current ubiquity of gambling has 
renewed interest in the sociological and cultural analysis of the activity.  Erving 
Goffman’s concepts of “action “ and “character,” discussed in Where the Action Is, and 
other aspects of his oeuvre, provide resources for interrogating the present legalized 
gambling environment and the micro-social aspects of gambling activities and identities.  
The latter are addressed through Goffman’s contribution to the sociological 
understanding of processes of normalization and the social classification of selves.  His 
analyses of stigma, moral career, labeling processes, and the institutional shaping of 
selves (e.g., Asylums (1961)) are drawn upon as resources for understanding gambling 
identities and stigmas as sociological-dramaturgical phenomena. Goffman’s work is 
related to the changing institutional basis of gambling activities, and to broader social 
organizational changes that have been accounted for through the concepts of 





The social world is such that any individual who is strongly oriented to action, as some 
gamblers are, can perceive the potentialities for chance in situations others would see as 
devoid of eventfulness…Chance is not merely sought out but carved out.  
 
Where the Action Is (Erving Goffman 1967: 201) 
 
The expansion of legalized and commercialized gambling that is occurring in the U.S., 
Canada, Australia, the U.K., and in many other countries, can be situated in relation to a broader 
cultural shift toward post-industrial, consumption-driven societies.  This expansion has proceeded 
rapidly since the early 1990s, and the current ubiquity of gambling has renewed interest in the 
sociological and cultural analysis of the activity (Castellani 2000; Cosgrave 2006; McMillen 
1996; Nibert 2000; Reith 2002, 2003; Schwartz 2003).  In North America, most legal forms of 
gambling are easily accessible: from casino gambling and horse racing at specific sites, to lottery 
tickets and scratch and win games in convenience stores, to internet sports gambling and poker, 
which can be accessed from the comfort of one’s home.  Along with this expansion and 
accessibility has come the creation of new gambling markets, including the relatively recent 
participation in gambling activities by the middle class (Fabian 1990), and the participation by 
particular groups such as youth, women, and seniors.  Gambling has become a widespread 
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popular cultural activity and is marketed to everyone as a consumer activity, typically as a form 
of entertainment.   
In its various legalized manifestations, gambling is a form of consumption whereby 
actors demonstrate orientations to pleasure, desire, and leisure in the “consumer society” 
(Campbell 1987; Hannigan 1998; Kingma 1997).  While an analytical emphasis on consumption 
is displacing the classical sociological emphasis on production as a resource for theorizing the 
social organization and culture of (late) modern societies (Baudrillard 1975, 1988; Bauman 2001; 
Miller 1995; Ritzer 1998), the phenomenon of risk has also come to occupy a central place in the 
sociological analysis and understanding of these societies (Beck 1992, 1994, 1995, 2003; Giddens 
1990, 1991; Lupton 1999; Lyng 1990, 2005).1  
This paper develops a Goffmanian perspective to formulate some of the significant 
cultural, institutional, and interactional aspects of the present legalized gambling environment, 
and examines the changing discursive constructions of gambling that have occurred.  While much 
has changed since the publication of Goffman’s rich, but neglected essay Where the Action Is 
(1967), it and other pertinent aspects of his oeuvre provide the opportunity for interrogating the 
present gambling environment, as well as for sociological theorizing around the topics of 
consumption and risk. Goffman’s analyses of action, character, and fatefulness (1967), stigma 
(1963) and moral career (1959a), his conception of labeling processes (1961), and dramaturgical 
sociological approach generally (1959b), will serve as resources for the sociological interrogation 
of the micro-social aspects of gambling activities and identities within an environment that has 
been shaped by the rationalization, expansion and commercialization of gambling opportunities.  
While Where the Action Is was not directly about the sociology of gambling, his 
interactionist analysis of action nevertheless contributes to this area and helps to understand the 
social organization of forms of risk-taking and the ways in which actors understand these 
activities and orient themselves to them in particular settings (Goffman 1967: 201).  Goffman’s 
work also provides resources for understanding changing understandings and definitions of risk-
taking, particularly as they pertain to gambling stigmas. 
The paper begins with a discussion of Goffman’s contribution to the sociology of 
gambling and his formulations of “action” and “character.”  These formulations are then related 
to three themes that address the changed gambling environment: first, macro social changes 
involving the rationalization, expansion, and commercialization of gambling.  Secondly, 
contemporary discussions of consumption and risk as these topics are presented in social-
theoretical perspectives of late modernity.  Finally, their pertinence for a consideration of the 
contemporary stigmas of “problem” and “pathological” gambling is developed. Here, Goffman’s 
analyses of stigma, moral career, labeling processes, and the institutional shaping of selves (e.g., 
Asylums (1961)) are drawn upon as resources for understanding gambling stigmas as 
sociological-dramaturgical phenomena.  From a Goffmanian perspective, “normal” and 
problematic gambling orientations are to be accounted for in relation to moral careers and social 
processes of evaluation and classification.  Goffman thus contributes to the sociological 
understanding of the “processes of becoming a pathological gambler” (Castellani 2000).  With 
respect to the changing definitions of gambling as a social activity, I conclude that the processes 
of normalization and classification are related to changing social-organizational, cultural, and 
institutional conditions, which generate new definitions of character.  
 
Where the Action Was 
 
Published in 1967, Goffman’s essay was commissioned as a study on criminality, and 
appeared in Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior.  Goffman based many of his 
observations and insights concerning “action” on his ethnographic study of casino gambling, as 
well as his experience as a blackjack dealer in a Las Vegas casino.2  His formulation of the 
criminal’s “prior commitment” to risky activities—akin in certain respects to the gambler’s 
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commitment where it is not only the payoff that counts, but the orientation to action and risk 
involved (Goffman 1967: 182)—is not a formulation typically found in deviance and criminology 
studies or text books.  Goffman’s contribution to the study of deviance has for the most part been 
represented through his analysis of stigma (Goffman 1993), the idea of moral career (Goffman 
1959a; Rubington and Weinberg 1996) and his dramaturgical theory (Deutschmann 2002; 
Goffman, 1959b), but his discussion in Where the Action Is presents a novel interpretation of 
deviance and criminality, anticipating the current sociological interest in voluntary risk-taking 
(Lyng 1990; 2005).  
When Goffman wrote Where the Action Is in the mid 1960s, Las Vegas was the sole 
location of legal casino gambling in North America, and the spread of state-run lotteries was only 
beginning to develop.  Gambling was still viewed culturally as an outsider activity, a deviant 
activity engaged in by members of particular subcultures.  This view of gambling was reproduced 
in sociological analyses, from studies of horse race bettors (Herman 1967; Zola 1964) to poker 
players (Hayano 1977).  
There have been earlier accounts of gambling activities and behaviors that have signaled 
the importance of Goffman’s work for the sociological study of gambling (Downes et al. 1976; 
Frey 1984).  Frey (1984: 114), for example, notes that “Goffman’s work clearly demonstrates the 
potential of gambling activity for further sociological research, particularly at the interactional, 
phenomenological level.”  Downes et al. (1976) note the liberating effect of Goffman’s analysis: 
 
The force of Goffman’s essay on gambling is that he lifts gambling out of the moral 
abyss into which successive generations of commentators and reformers have consigned 
it and renders possible a consideration of its meaning which is freed from a priori 
associations of a negative kind.3 
 
Since the publication of these works—the latter focusing on gambling activities in the British 
context—the North American environment has become significantly more gambling-rich due to 
legalization and expansion.  Since the 1960s, we can speak of three waves of gambling 
expansion: the first, occurring with the spread of state-sponsored lotteries in the 1960s and 1970s; 
the second: the spread of commercial and state-operated casinos primarily in the 1990s; and 
finally the appearance of internet gambling and its burgeoning popularity in the early 21st century. 
These types of gambling are still expanding, and certain forms have mutated, so that while state-
run lotteries are still popular revenue-generators for governments, lotto products, such as scratch 
and win cards, are available in corner stores.  In some jurisdictions, governments are involved in 
sports gambling, but the privately run internet sports sites are presently still illegal.  There is also 
gambling hybridization, as evidenced by the transformation of race tracks into “racinos” 
(Eadington, 2003).      
 
Goffman on Action and Character 
 
Goffman saw “action” as a particular analytical object through which he could explore 
aspects of the self.  The various forms of action, where risk, danger, and thrills are oriented to, are 
institutions for the accomplishment of desirable experiences, with possible consequences for the 
self.  Action is thus theorized by Goffman as a method of self-constitution, having ontological 
significance, and being institutionalized through various activities that allow for its expression. 
While recognized primarily as a micro-sociological analyst, Goffman sought to connect the micro 
and institutional realms (Goffman 1961; Rawls 2003).  He analytically linked the micro-
sociological concern with the self to the institutional possibilities for its exploration.   
 By “action,” Goffman meant “activities that are consequential, problematic, and 
undertaken for what is felt to be their own sake” (1967:185).  Further, “Whoever participates in 
action does so in two quite distinct capacities: as someone who hazards or chances something 
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valuable, and as someone who must perform whatever activities are called for” (p. 186).  While 
diverse institutions and activities could supply “action”—from high-risk jobs to criminal 
enterprises to arenas for thrills—Goffman’s main focus is gambling activities, since the term 
itself was developed in the gambling context (1967: 186).  
While pointing out the consequentiality of many of our everyday actions and decisions, 
Goffman’s analysis was concerned with those actions which were problematic for the actor, and 
as such had “fateful” consequences.  He writes, “the crux of the essay is the transition from 
consequentiality to fatefulness.  Fatefulness is the mark of the threshold between retaining some 
control over the consequences of one’s actions and their going out of control” (Goffman 1967: 
27).  This notion of “control over consequences” is especially relevant with respect to the 
contemporary stigmas of “problem” and “pathological” gambling, and will be discussed in the 
last section of the paper.  Goffman’s analysis of the consequentiality and fatefulness of various 
types of action demonstrates a phenomenological orientation that seeks to understand the 
gambling experience for the actor, and the importance of action for self-constitution.4  What is the 
significance of fatefulness for the actor? 
For Goffman, action is an orientation, a desire on the part of the actor, which is 
undertaken for its own sake, and demands “prior commitment” (1967: 152).  Like the criminal, 
the gambler acts in terms of prior commitment to problematic consequentiality, and orients him 
or herself to fatefulness.  According to Goffman, “bets…have subjective values and ‘socially 
ratified’ values because of what winning or losing allows the gambler to do later…this is 
consequentiality and influences the later life of the bettor” (1967: 159).  In the face of fatefulness, 
and aside from what the actual winning or losing means in material terms for the latter, the 
gambler orients to the unknown, where action is revealed as an investment in “character.” 
Character can be understood in a dual sense: first, in terms of “self-constitution” whereby the 
responses of the actor are not yet known because the outcome of the gamble itself is unknown; 
the gambler is open and mood and attitude are grounded in the activity (Kusyszyn 1977; Reith 
2002).  The gambler must orient to himself/herself in anticipation of the outcome and after the 
outcome is known. But this orienting is also performed as a social action, in a setting where one’s 
prior commitment to fatefulness is a public performance.  How does the individual manage 
him/herself under fateful circumstances, where one is on the brink of losing control?  This 
oriented performance calls for “maintenance properties,” such as courage, integrity, gallantry, and 
composure (Goffman 1967: 218-222). One’s character is performed, and as performance, is 
judged by others.  Character is thus an individual project of self-constitution, situated in particular 
settings of action; it is also a socially ratified value, calling for self-control and proper 
performance.  As an idealized trait, character is linked to the requirements of social organization: 
 
Social organization everywhere has the problem of morale and continuity.  Individuals 
must come to all their little situations with some enthusiasm and concern, for it is largely 
through such moments that social life occurs, and if a fresh effort were not put into each 
of them, society would surely suffer…To satisfy the fundamental requirements of morale 
and continuity, we are encouraged in a fundamental illusion. It is our character. (Goffman 
1967: 238-239) 
  
The link between micro and institutional realms, mentioned earlier, is a feature of the 
Durkheimian influence that undergirds Goffman’s micro-sociological perspective.5  From this 
perspective, the revelation of “character” should be viewed as a behavior that is highly valued in 
moral terms (Burns 1992).  According to Goffman (1967: 229), “Because persons in all societies 
must transact much of their enterprise in social situations, we must expect that the capacity to 
maintain support of the social occasion under difficult circumstances will be universally 
approved.”  Goffman scholar Tom Burns (1992: 129) points out the tension in Goffman’s work 
between, on the one hand, the Durkheimian emphasis on moral order, and on the other, the ethical 
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characteristics of character, where character cannot be understood, or reveal itself, as rule 
following.  As such, action involves risk, not only in terms of one’s material stake, but also 
sociologically, in terms of one’s stake in character and identity.   
Goffman defines character as “what is essential and unchanging about the individual—
what is characteristic of him.”  However, he remarks that this concept also “refers to attributes 
that can be generated and destroyed during fateful moments…Thus a paradox. Character is both 
unchanging and changeable.  And yet that is how we conceive it” (1967: 237).  It is interesting to 
follow the line suggested by the notion of fatefulness, i.e., that not only does action offer the risk 
and opportunity to display conduct, but rather that “character is gambled” and as such, is made 
“problematic” through the encounter with fate (p. 237).  In other words, fatefulness is a feature of 
self-constitution, whereby the self can be “voluntarily subjected to re-creation” (p. 238).  
 
Gambling Rationalization, Action and Risk 
 
 The gambling environment has changed dramatically since the publication of Where the 
Action Is.  In the essay, Goffman had romantic conceptions of action and character, lamenting the 
disappearance of real avenues for character tests in modern society.  As he writes, “Although 
every society no doubt has scenes of action, it is our own society that has found a word for it. 
Interestingly enough, we have become alive to action at a time when—compared to other 
societies—we have sharply curtailed in civilian life the occurrence of fatefulness of the serious, 
heroic, and dutiful kind” (Goffman 1967: 192-193).  Action had become commercialized in 
various sites (pp. 194-206) and the casino was one such site, albeit one where the consequences 
of action, or risks, were deemed to be manageable compared to the fatefulness of everyday life 
decisions (p. 262).  
The present day colonization, rationalization, and commercialization of communal and 
informal forms of gambling by the state and commercial enterprises (Cosgrave and Klassen 2001; 
McMillen 1996), and the concomitant definition of gambling as “leisure activity” or form of 
entertainment, raises questions about the status and meaning of such notions as character and 
fatefulness.  It is pertinent here to invoke recent sociological work that has sought to provide 
more micro-analytical formulations of risk, in which risk-taking is viewed in terms of its positive 
values for the actor.  Deborah Lupton’s book Risk for example, an overview of the various social 
scientific formulations of risk, contains a chapter specifically on extreme sports, “edgework,” 
transgression, and other forms of risk-taking (Lupton 1999: 148-172).  As she suggests, while 
most contemporary formulations present risk as something negative, “there also exists a counter 
discourse in which risk-taking is represented far more positively” (1999: 148-149): 
 
Against the ideal of the highly controlled ‘civilized body/self is the discourse which 
valorizes escape from the bonds of control and regulation…This (counter discourse) 
rejects the ideal of the disembodied rational actor for an ideal of the self that emphasizes 
sensual embodiment and the visceral and emotional flights produced by encounters with 
danger, of ‘walking on the wild side’. (p. 149) 
 
The themes Lupton presents above are addressed in specific ways in Where the Action Is. 
Curiously, while Lupton acknowledges aspects of Giddens’ discussions of risk, she never 
mentions Goffman’s work on action and risk in the whole book.6 
Lyng (2005), developing the concept of “edgework,” presents what appear to be 
contradictory ways to conceive risk-taking in relation to contemporary social order.  On the one 
hand, risk can be theorized as an escape from the routines of everyday life in rationalized and 
disenchanted societal contexts (p.6).  On the other, and “Framed in terms of the risk society 
model,” risk-taking may be considered a “pure expression of the central institutional and cultural 
imperatives of the emerging social order” (p. 5).  In this order “the pursuit of risk becomes more 
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than a response to the central imperatives of modern society. It is itself a key structural principle 
extending throughout the social system in institutional patterns of economic, political, cultural, 
and leisure activity” (p. 8).  The first interpretation of risk-taking activities echoes the 
Goffmanian perspective.  However, given the second formulation of the institutional openness to 
risk-taking characteristic of late modern society, and Lyng’s own emphasis on the significance of 
“edgework” practices, Goffman’s notion of the curtailing of fatefulness in the modern social 
order might be debated. Nevertheless, the present-day commercialization of gambling 
demonstrates a form of “McDonaldization,” exhibiting rationalizing and standardizing processes 
(Hannigan 1998; Ritzer 1993).  This rationalization is concretized, in the first instance, in the 
environmental organization of the casino’s orientation to chance and contingency.  In the casino, 
the calculation of probabilities is the rule, the house has the edge and, as much as possible, 
nothing is left to chance.  This rationalization is reinforced by the extent of surveillance therein.7 
In some settings, casinos are situated alongside opportunities for shopping and for access to 
concerts and other forms of entertainment, such that gambling activity is located spatially as just 
another shopping and entertainment experience.  
In his analysis of the postmodern “fantasy city,” Hannigan (1998: 84) notes that “one of 
the leading principles of UED (urban entertainment destination) development is the minimization 
of risk…leisure merchants must be able to roll out new entertainment concepts…in a 
standardized, predictable form…and many of the elements of predictability of control…can be 
seen in the design of and operation of Fantasy City.”  These urban entertainment destinations, of 
which casinos are often an important component, seek to offer the opportunity for consumers to 
“take chances that are not really chances” (p. 71).  Goffman (1967: 267-270) foresaw these 
developments: 
 
Commercialization, of course, brings the final mingling of fantasy and action.  And it has 
an ecology.  On the arcade strips of urban settlements and summer resorts, scenes are 
available for hire where the customer can be the star performer in gambles enlivened by 
being very slightly consequential.  Here a person currently without social connections can 
insert coins in skill machines to demonstrate to the other machines that he has socially 
approved qualities of character.  These naked little spasms of the self occur at the end of 
his world, but there at the end is action and character.  Nevertheless, while one can orient 
oneself to gambling itself as a vehicle for entertainment or “riskless risk” (Hannigan 
1998; Nye 1981), where consequences are slight to non-existent, one can also interpret it 
as an opportunity for action and fatefulness.  This, of course, depends on the type of 
gambling, the stakes involved, and the participant’s orientation and “character.” 
  
In his analysis of gambling action, Goffman was no doubt interested in those individuals 
who gambled in such a way that character was on the line, and where the gambling activity itself 
was fateful.  These action seekers demonstrated and oriented to the previously mentioned 
“maintenance properties.”  The games these types of gamblers participated in—poker, black jack, 
horse racing—require skill rather than entail pure chance.  The ideal type here might be the 
legendary gambler, Nick the Greek who, as lore would have it, went from rags to riches seventy-
three times, won and lost millions of dollars in his gambling career, and considered money 
primarily as a means to gambling action (Thackrey 1968).  According to Nick the Greek, 
“Money…has been made a substitute in our society for almost anything you can name.  Even for 
character. I’m just sorry we have to use if for gambling. It’s only a stake!” (Thackrey 1968:11).  
The emphasis on action and character continues to be found in high stakes poker, which 
is currently enjoying an upsurge in popularity, thanks in part to television coverage of poker 
tournaments and availability of opportunities to play on the internet.  While the notion of 
character is present when winning or losing at roulette (e.g. maintaining composure and 
integrity), it cannot be said that slot machine players are engaged in demonstrations of character 
in Goffman’s sense.  Although a large jackpot win in slot machine or lottery play could be fateful, 
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the probabilities are against the player, and the purposeful risks they take are inconsequential. 
Further, the cost of playing such games is typically low, although, with increasingly sophisticated 
electronic machines, the costs (both in monetary and behavioral terms) may escalate (Dickerson 
2004).  While slot players may desire to be “in action” for as long as possible, this form of action 
does not involve the gambling of character that Goffman discussed.   
The colonization and commercialization of gambling may be viewed in terms of the ways 
it diminishes the possibilities for action and the performance of character.  Most individuals who 
gamble in the various legalized settings are not the seekers of action that Goffman discussed—a 
trend that is revealed by the extent of public participation in lottery play compared to more skilled 
forms of gambling, and the extent to which casino gambling is oriented to mechanical and 
electronic games of chance.  Large-scale commercial casinos have been characterized 
disparagingly as “slot warehouses,” and this type of gambling is the economic “bread and butter” 
of such enterprises.  It is indeed telling that race-tracks in North America are increasingly relying 
on slot machines to draw and retain customers.  The action and character aspects of horse betting 
(Herman 1967; Zola 1964) are being engulfed by the characterless and mindless forms of 
machine gambling—the race track becomes the “racino” (Eadington 2003). Further, 
advertisements of commercialized gambling depict it as a form of entertainment or excitement 
consumption, but the latter should not be fateful for the participant.  A non-fateful orientation—
one which precludes the risk of real loss and its consequentialities—is  emphasized in the official 
messages of state-sponsored gambling agencies that advocate “responsible gambling” (RCGO 
2003).  
The social organization of commercialized and state-sponsored gambling then appears to 
shape the gambling experience away from the orientation to action and the demonstration of 
character.  The more popular forms of gambling—lottery, slot machine, and video lottery play—
are not conducive to or oriented toward the possibility of character tests, and the type of action 
these games entail is not agonistic.  Here luck, rather than risk, appears to be a reigning 
orientation. It encourages passivity and does not require one to put anything on the line.  If 
fatefulness occurs, it is bestowed by chance rather than being actively courted or sought out 
(Goffman 1967: 201).  Orientations to action thus signal the character of the participant and the 
agonistic or aleatory framings of the particular type of gambling activity.  
 
Late Modernity, Consumption and Risk 
 
 Goffman’s analysis of action pertains not only to the present-day culture of legalized 
gambling, but also to the contemporary sociological formulations of risk advanced by Giddens 
(1990, 1991), Beck (1992, 1994, 2003), Lyng (1990, 2005), Lupton (1999) and others.  One of 
the central themes of Beck’s “reflexive modernization” thesis, as well as Giddens’ work on risk, 
concerns not only the issue of the uncertainties of late modernity, but the ways institutions 
respond to these.8  The move by states into gambling enterprises has been viewed as a response to 
risks in a globalizing world of social, political, and economic uncertainty (Cosgrave and Klassen 
2001; Della Salla 2004; Neary and Taylor 1998).  
Beck develops one aspect of uncertainty in terms of the breakdown in the access to, and 
significance of, gainful employment: “risk societies” are no longer “gainful employment 
societies” (Beck 2003: 6).  For Beck and other commentators, the uncertainties generated by 
globalization have also produced a diminished welfare-state, where state provision of forms of 
social insurance is cut back, and risks are increasingly downloaded onto individuals (Baker and 
Simon, 2002; Beck, 1996; Neary and Taylor, 1998).  The relation of hard work to merit and 
reward has less power to shape actors’ orientations if access to, and stability of gainful 
employment, and the rewards derived from it, are more difficult.  As such, the role of chance and 
risk-taking, dissociated from a hard work orientation, becomes a more legitimate social 
orientation in risk societies.    
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The state-promotion of gambling, especially lotteries, deserves consideration in relation 
to these themes.  Not only is the idea of getting “something for nothing” promoted (Lears 2003), 
but also that one’s life chances will be affected by chance, rather than by gainful employment. 
Governments themselves, in their quest for new forms of non-tax revenues are significant players 
in the ongoing assault on the Protestant work ethic.  One of the slogans for Canada’s “Super 7” 
lottery is “Earning money is great; winning it is even better.” As many scholars of the emerging 
consumer society have remarked (Bell 1975; Campbell 1987; Riesman 1953), this assault has 
been some time in the making.  It is intriguing to think of those governments and states that 
promote and expand gambling as analogous, on a macro-level, to a Goffmanian risk-taker who 
can no longer be understood in terms of “providential” coping (Goffman, 1967).9  
Although Giddens’ work on the place of risk in late modernity (1990, 1991, 1994) shares 
certain thematic similarities with Beck’s analyses, and offers a largely macro-perspective (Lupton 
1999: 81), it nevertheless formulates a conception of the positive values of risk-taking for self-
identity.  Giddens draws upon Goffman’s notions of fatefulness and consequentiality.10  He 
situates actor orientations to consequential action in relation to the late modern societal 
environment of uncertainties, where safety and the removal of risks become valorized.  While risk 
may be undesirable from the perspective of experts and expert systems, uncertainties also 
represent an opportunity for self-exploration (Giddens 1991).  In this environment, “cultivated 
risk” comes to have value for the self.  As Giddens (1991:133) suggests: 
 
Cultivated risk here converges with some of the most basic operations of modernity.  The 
capability to disturb the fixity of things, open up new pathways, and thereby colonise a 
segment of a novel future, is integral to modernity’s unsettling character.  We could say, I 
think, that cultivated risk represents an ‘experiment with trust’…which consequently has 
implications for an individual’s self-identity.  
  
For Giddens, fateful moments apply to individuals and collectivities and challenge or 
shatter our “ontological security” (1991: 35-69).  Where Goffman is concerned with the 
“threshold between retaining some control over the consequences of one’s actions and their going 
out of control” (1967: 27), Giddens sees the issue of control from a macro-perspective by asking 
about the role of fate and destiny in a late modern world of uncertainties, where humans 
nevertheless seek control of the natural and social environments.  
Both Goffman and Giddens formulate positive conceptions of risk-taking, linking it in 
their particular ways to the project of self-constitution.  Goffman’s formulation of action 
preserves risk as something to be embraced, linking risk-taking itself to the display and formation 
of character.  Giddens sees the positive emphasis on risk-taking in relation to the more 
psychological objective of “self-actualization” (1991: 70-80).   
 As discussed in the previous section, Lyng (1990, 2005) develops a conception of the 
relation of self to larger macro-processes, viewing “edgework” as a cultural expression and 
orientation to action in the context of late modern society.  Edgework also reveals character 
(although Lyng does not use the term) through the demonstration of skill and mastery in one’s 
activity, and is a form of self-actualization.  Lyng thus bridges the formulations of Goffman and 
Giddens, as well as the sociological discourses on consumption and risk, by articulating the 
changing social context within which orientations to risk-taking take place, showing that 
particular forms of experience consumption are grounded on orientations to risk, and 
demonstrating the positive values of risk-taking for the self (Lyng, 1990, 2005).  While Lyng 
does not view gambling as a form of edgework, it is reasonable to suggest that high-stakes poker 
games or even forms of illegal gambling (where risk of detection or danger may be involved) 
demonstrate edgework characteristics.11 
 In relation to the uncertainties generated by late modern or “risk societies,” 
contemporary gambling as a social activity is a form of consumption, an embodiment of 
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orientations—risky, playful, or “pathological”—to uncertainty in the larger culture (Kingma 
1997).  
 
Modern Identity, Character and Gambling Stigmas 
 
Goffman’s concerns with action, character, and fatefulness, and his dynamic conception 
of labeling processes provide the basis for a sociological consideration of the current designations 
“problem” and “pathological” gambling, and the institutional basis of their development.  In 
Where the Action Is, Goffman discusses the existence of “adaptations,” those strategies actors use 
for controlling fatefulness. Ritualistic superstitions—expressions of what Reith (2002) refers to as 
a “magical-religious worldview”—are a particular strategy of gamblers, and the very notion of 
fate is formulated by Goffman (1967: 179-180) as a defensive determinism:  
 
It is not surprising then, that when a causal basis is not readily found for discounting the 
determinativeness of the current situation, it may be sought out, and where it can’t be 
found imagined…A version of this ‘defensive determinism’ is found in the belief in fate, 
predestination, and kismet—the notion that the major outcomes regarding oneself are 
already writ down, and one is helpless to improve or worsen one’s chances.  
 
Other analysts of gambling behavior and those who study in the clinical world of gambling 
addictions, point out the irrationality of some gamblers’ beliefs, for example, concerning such 
things as probabilities, belief in luck, etc. (Delfabbro 2004; Elster 2003; Lesieur 1984).  For 
Goffman however, “action need not be perceived, in the first instance as an expression of 
impulsiveness or irrationality…Loss, to be sure, is chanced through action, but a real gain of 
character can occur. It is in these terms that action can be seen as a calculated risk” (1967b: 238). 
If gambling activities, in their risk-taking and action-oriented forms, are to be understood in 
relation to the notion of fatefulness, then we might speak of the institutionalizing of legal 
gambling in terms of the opportunities, for better or worse, for encounters with fate. 
Notwithstanding the issue of whether most forms of commercialized gambling constitute 
authentic avenues for the pursuit of action and fatefulness, it is nevertheless much easier to access 
“action” if one wishes.  As Goffman is interested in the institutional settings and possibilities for 
action (p. 211), and the analysis of action itself as an institutionalized method for the revelation of 
character, the changing social and institutional basis for the evaluation of character must be 
addressed. 
Historically, gambling, as a collective representation (Durkheim 1982), has signified the 
problem of moral excess in various ways, whether in earlier versions as sin or vice, or today, 
pathology (a medical term with moral connotations) (Castellani 2000; Collins 1996; Reith 2002). 
The legalization and expansion of gambling reveals a culture where a particular type of risk-
taking activity is no longer constructed in negative moral terms. Unlike earlier representations, 
gambling activity itself is no longer viewed as morally problematic, but “out of control” 
orientations are. Gambling activity has moved from a moral to a medical framework that, within a 
legalized gambling environment, traces a continuum ranging from non-problematic gambling 
activities (entertainment, excitement, thrills, etc.) to “pathological gambling.”  This shift in 
framework is related to changes that are visible in the representation of gambling in the 
psychology literature.  For example, France (1902), Freud (1928) and Bergler (1957) saw 
gambling as a problematic activity. Drawing upon Freud, Bergler viewed the gambler as a 
“misunderstood neurotic” (1943), and gambling itself as a form of “psychic masochism” (1957).  
Bergler, however, had a profound influence on the development of the medical model of 
gambling behavior (Bergler 1957; Castellani 2000).  As Castellani notes, Bergler was writing 
within a social context where gambling was illegal, and often associated with deviants and 
“racketeer-gamblers.”  This illegitimacy of gambling, Castellani argues, “had a major discursive 
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effect on the construction of Bergler’s text, as well as the position and authority of the medical 
model for the next 22 years” (Castellani 2000: 27).  A consequence of Bergler’s work was a 
discursive transformation of the gambling criminal into someone with a “mental illness” (28). 
In the more contemporary literature, gambling does not represent a psychological deficit, 
but “excessive” gambling does (Castellani 2000).  It should be noted that the specific terms 
“problem” and “pathological” gambler did not exist in the 1960s when most forms of gambling 
outside Las Vegas were illegal, and gambling liberalization was only just beginning.  Although 
compulsive gambling was referred to in the medical terminology, and problematic forms of 
gambling have been the object of concern in institutions such as Gamblers Anonymous 
(Castellani 2000), the full medicalization of gambling in terms of the  “pathological” did not 
occur until the 1980s.  The definition of excessive gambling as “Pathological Gambling” was 
officially announced with the publication of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders III (DSM III) in 1980 (Castellani 2000).  
The medicalization of gambling problems has coincided with the legalization and 
expansion of gambling (Castelllani, 2000; Collins 1996).  This medicalization however also tends 
to treat gambling problems as a form of individual pathology (Castellani 2000).  While the 
gambler has been depicted historically as a problematic actor in religious discourse (particularly 
Protestantism), and acknowledged as a burgeoning “social problem”  through the discourse of 
Gamblers Anonymous beginning in the 1950s (Castellani 2000), with the spread of 
commercialized gambling, the “problem gambler” has attained a broad level of recognizability as 
a social type and a social problem.  This process has occurred through the making visible of the 
“problem” in the psychology literature (Bergler 1957; Castellani 2000; Collins 1996; Hacking 
2004; Lesieur 1977; Lesieur and Blume 1987) and through greater recognition of the “problem” 
(and type) by the lay public. 
The terminological shifts are significant: the gambling “sucker” and “loser” of the past, 
whom Bergler (1957) called the “neurotic sucker- gambler” might now be characterized or 
labeled as a “problem” or “pathological” gambler.  Further, the gambling “loser” did not have the 
same kind of access to medical treatment that we find today for individuals who want to seek help 
for their behavior.  The terminological and interpretive shifts must be thus understood in relation 
to changes in the social organization of gambling. 
Brian Castellani (2000) has provided a sociologically-informed analysis of the links 
between societal developments around gambling legalization and the rise of the term and medical 
problem “pathological gambling.”  Drawing upon the works of Anselm Strauss and Michel 
Foucault, Castellani refers to his theory as “discursive interactionism,” and his method as 
“assemblage” (2000: 15).  There are similarities between Castellani’s discussion of the “process 
of becoming a pathological gambler” (59) and Goffman’s interest in the interplay between 
interaction and forms of moral attribution that we find in his analysis of moral careers (1959a) 
and stigma (1963).  Castellani analyzes the “making of a medical problem” in relation to the 
development of the medical-psychological institution that has been built up around the particular 
construct “pathological gambling.”  Goffman would no doubt be interested in the story of the 
development and rise of this institution of normalization, and the ways in which it has generated, 
and depends upon, labeling processes (Goffman 1959a, 1961, 1963). 
For Goffman, labeling is a dynamic, interactional process, and Ian Hacking has recently 
provided insight into the social classification of individuals through his analysis of processes of 
“making up people” (Hacking 2002, 2004).  Drawing upon the work of Goffman and Foucault, he 
further develops the notion of “dynamic nominalism” to refer to the social processes through 
which selves interact with institutional classifications and categories (Hacking 2004).  The actors’ 
acceptance of classifications in turn has dynamic effects on the classifiers’ knowledges.  The 
institutional and expert interpretations of behavior provide discursive frameworks individuals use 
to “understand” their own behaviors (Collins 1996; Hacking 2002, 2004).  Accordingly, gamblers 
may use the discourse of gambling addiction, advertisements for “responsible gambling,” etc., as 
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a way of representing their own gambling behaviors to themselves and others.  The 
medicalization of gambling problems then raises the question of how individuals interact with the 
classifications, whether they will accept, and internalize labels or stigmas such as “problem” 
gambler, and whether they will seek help after internalizing the stigma (Goffman 1963; Hacking 
2004).  
The medicalized discourse of problem gambling has brought with it “agents” and 
“mediators” who claim expertise in the definition of gambling problems (Castellani 2000; 
Goffman, 1959a, 1961) and who contribute to the labeling of individuals as problematic 
gamblers.  In Asylums, Goffman analyzed the institutional process of classification and the 
practices that follow from classifications in terms of their consequences for actors’ self-
conceptions.  Goffman referred to the process of “looping” to characterize the institutional 
dynamics that press upon identity and produce the kind of identity required by the institution 
(1961).  In light of the broad cultural processes that have generated the legalization and expansion 
of commercialized gambling, the changing cultural and social-structural frameworks have given 
rise to new institutions and new definitions of character (Collins 1996; Hacking 2004; Sumner 
1994).  
With easy access to gambling opportunities, and no longer constrained by negative social, 
moral, and legal valuations of the activity, modern gamblers must discover their own behavioral 
limits, and assume the risks for their own choices and involvement in this activity (Lash 2003: 
53-54).  While in broad terms gambling activities may appear to be morally unconstrained, this 
does not mean that morality disappears; the social organizational requirements of continuity and 
morale persist.  In a climate of ubiquitous gambling opportunities then, the gambler must face the 
consequentiality of gambling, and one option is to become, in the official terminology, a 
“responsible” gambler (Kelly 2003; Responsible Gambling Council Ontario 2003).  In late 
modern consumer societies, where new consumer objects are produced and desires liberated 
(Baumann 2001), the risk of moral stigmatization arises, not in terms of  the involvement in the 
activity itself (e.g. gambling), but in terms of the consequences of excessive involvement.  
 
Problematic or Responsible Performance 
 
The idea of the individual’s character, and the maintenance properties that are 
demonstrated through it is, from a dramaturgical perspective, a performance or form of self-
presentation (Goffman 1959b).  The active orientation and prior commitment to risk-taking has 
social and ontological significance for the actor.  Orienting to the notion of the “fragility of the 
interactional order” (Rawls 2003), Goffman’s work is a sociological account of the risks involved 
at the micro or interactional level.  In “On Face-Work,” The Presentation of Self and Everyday 
Life, and elsewhere, Goffman formulates the risks of interaction, characterized by such 
interactional problems as loss of face, faux pas, gaffes, communications out of character, 
embarrassments, and audiences not taking performances seriously (1959b, 1967a).  However, the 
analysis in Where the Action Is presents a stronger formulation of risk for the actor.  While in the 
latter, he constructs the actor as seeking—and “carving out”—action and testing character, in the 
former works the actor is theorized as orienting to the need to prevent and manage interactional 
risks, and largely desires a positive response from others through “impression management” 
(Goffman 1959b: 208-237).  This actor does not seek out risk, or risk character.  
Goffman’s formulation of character, not to mention his own interactionist formulation of 
the grounds of self-hood, rests on an underlying conception of its performativity: character (and 
the self) is a public performance—it implies the “social” and requires an audience in order to 
reveal itself and be what it will be (Goffman 1959b).  The evaluation of performances however 
takes place in relation to the broader cultural and social organizational frameworks that provide 
the interpretive understandings of, and for, selves.  Following this logic, one can understand 
“pathological” gambling and other addictions as certain types of self-performance or presentation, 
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where the addicted self is conceived or interpreted as non-social and hence, is stigmatized within 
the moral order (Goffman 1963).  Such a self might be said to be lacking in self-discipline and 
other of the “maintenance properties”—courage, integrity, gallantry, and composure, described 
by Goffman (1967: 218-219).  The pathological gambler can neither orient to action nor character 
in Goffman’s sense. Since such gamblers are labeled as “out of control” or not in control of their 
actions, their presentation of self is lost.  They are nevertheless stigmatized, i.e., evaluated in 
terms of their social being, as being out of control or having a “problem,” etc. (Goffman 1963). 
As the label “addict” represents a form of discredited identity (Goffman 1963), the label signifies 
a bad performance.  The issue of “addiction” nevertheless raises the question of whether the 
addict can be conceived as an actor in the sociological sense.  In any case the addict (pathological 
gambler, etc.), like the “mental patient” (Goffman 1959a), gives a performance that receives a 
negative social evaluation.  
A possible consequence or outcome of the actor’s orientation to action can be the 
phenomenon, not only psychological, but dramaturgical, of “chasing losses” (Lesieur 1984).  
Here we find an oriented action—“chasing”—but also the implication that one cannot resist doing 
otherwise. The “chase” is a feature of the “career of the compulsive gambler” (Lesieur 1984).  
The ideas of “career” and stigma (“compulsive gambler”), are to be noted, concepts which 
Goffman conceived as interrelated dramaturgical phenomena in his study of “the moral career of 
mental patients” (1959a).  Dramaturgical issues regarding the performance of character are also 
raised in relation to the availability of forms of internet gambling which are increasingly popular 
(e.g., sports betting, poker and simulated casino games), since this form of gambling is typically 
carried out in isolation, where there are no public constraints and no present, face-to-face 
audience to orient one’s performance to.12  The subtitle of Goffman’s Interaction Ritual is Essays 
in Face-to-Face Behavior; the ubiquity of gambling thus raises the issue of the performative 
aspects of character and the moral-evaluative contexts of interactions and rituals, especially in 
individualized contexts (internet gambling) and anonymous settings (large-scale casinos).   
In a broad cultural context where gambling has been legalized, rationalized, and marketed 
as entertainment, “responsibility” vis-à-vis gambling activity is one way in which social or moral 
character is discursively constructed now.  From a Goffmanian perspective, and indeed from a 
romantic-heroic perspective, the idea of “responsible” gambling is an odd notion, since one of the 
features of gambling, according to his analysis, is that it involves the risking of character.  As 
Goffman writes, “Character is gambled” (1967: 237); for him, insofar as it is a vehicle for action 
and the demonstration of character, gambling is valued positively. With the medicalized discourse 
of problem, pathological, or compulsive gambling, orientations to action and character—where 
actors are guided by choice and decision, and the embracing of risk, are foreclosed. 
 The fatefulness generated by an interest in action is a method through which the self can 
be “voluntarily subjected to re-creation.”  However, the potential fatefulness of gambling may not 
only be understood in terms of character gain through action and risk-taking, but also now in 
terms of the medicalized discourse of the risks of becoming a problematic gambler.  If 
“Fatefulness is the mark of the threshold between retaining some control over the consequences 
of one’s actions and their going out of control” (Goffman 1967 27), one’s fate in the gambling 
encounter could be to become an “out of control” or addicted gambler.  An important feature of 
Goffman’s dramaturgy, however, is the way in which processes of social classification wrest 
definitional control from the actor.  Fatefulness then can be the loss of control over self-
definition—through processes of stigmatization (1963)—and more dramatically and 
consequentially in institutions of normalization (1961). 
A dramatic orientation to fate and the possibility of radical change, with the possibility of 
“a real gain of character” (1967: 238) in Goffman’s sense however, is also foreclosed by the 
notion of responsibility.  Perhaps then, “character” has been rationalized; the maintenance 
properties described by Goffman have been replaced by the more regulative notion of responsible 
gambling.  Where gambling activity itself is no longer stigmatized and indeed is promoted by the 
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state, the social organizational requirements of morale and continuity (Goffman1967: 238-239) 
come to represent “character” through the discursive concerns with problem and pathological 
gambling.  In other words, character is presented and demonstrated through the prevention of 
these orientations to gambling, and the traits of responsibility and self-regulation are idealized.  
While the expansion of gambling provides more (rationalized) opportunities for action 
and encounters with fate, these opportunities are located within particular social organizational 
forms (e.g., neo-liberal regimes of social, moral and economic deregulation) and in contexts 
where the activities are discursively constructed in particular ways—in neo-liberal societies 
through discourses of medicalization, responsibility, and self-governing (Castellani 2000; Collins 
1996; Rose 1993, 1996).  If the notion of “character gain” is threatened by the present social 
organization and discursive formulations of gambling, we can nevertheless speak of “character 
loss,” particularly in relation to the concerns with problem and pathological gambling, or indeed 
with other activities where addiction is discursively represented as a risk related to particular 
forms of consumption.  In terms of character loss, Hacking notes, “Goffman spoke of 
mortification of the self, which severs the normal relation between people and their acts.  Not so 
much a case of making a person, as of unmaking a person” (2004: 298).  In relation to the stigmas 
of problem and pathological gambling, the institutional and cultural frameworks that have given 
rise to these terms must be noted.  That one gambles or is even a “gambler” no longer represents a 
stigma; problem and pathological gambling however are.  This shift in classification has 
developed alongside the broader cultural changes that have not only destigmatized gambling, but 
which have made visible the psychology of the problematic gambler (Collins 1996).  In 
Goffman’s Durkheimian idiom, the social organizational requirements of continuity and morale 
have changed.  These broad changes have been accompanied by the development of new 
institutional classifications and categories of the self, which constitute selves in particular ways, 




The present-day environment of legalized gambling is evidence, not only of the changing 
institutional basis of gambling activities, but of broader social organizational and cultural 
changes.  Consumption and risk have become central sociological concepts for understanding 
these changes.  In the social context Goffman was writing, the topics of action and character 
retained a particular aura, related at the time to the not-as-yet mainstream conceptions of 
gambling activity.  While the spread of commercialized gambling enterprises has provided 
individuals (consumers) with increased access to forms of action, the analytic value of the terms 
“action” and “character” has been reconsidered here in terms of the changed gambling 
environment.  Gambling is now mass-marketed as entertainment and often represented as 
“leisure” activity.  The place and significance of character displays in relation to these sanitized 
representations of gambling activity is diminished, and the depictions of gambling activities by 
official agencies emphasize the socially desirable trait of “responsibility.”  The latter form of self-
comportment does however, relate to gambling as a form of risk-taking. 
Despite the transformations in the gambling environment, the concepts and themes 
presented in Where the Action Is, and other pertinent aspects of Goffman’s oeuvre discussed here, 
provide a framework for interrogating this environment and the micro-social aspects of gambling 
activities and identities.  Goffman’s work is a contribution to the sociological understanding of 
risk-taking, and deserves more credit in this regard.  His work is also a valuable resource for the 
sociological understanding of processes of normalization and the social classification of selves.  
In his formulation, the interpretation and evaluation of character and the changing classifications 
of the self relate to the demands of social organization for “continuity and morale.”  Goffman’s 
dynamic conception of labeling processes contributes to the sociological understanding of how 
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current labels such as “problem,” “pathological,” and “responsible” gambling are institutional 
responses to the social organizational demands of a ubiquitous gambling environment. 
In terms of the links between character and social organization, the discursive 
relationship between self, social classifications and institutions provokes a final thought: in the 
1960s, when legal, state-sponsored gambling was not widespread, one could still analyze such 
phenomena as “action” and “character,” perhaps romanticizing their sociological significance. 
With the present-day expansion and rationalization of gambling, largely under the auspices of the 
state and revenue-hungry governments, where the governing of gambling behaviours enables 
legitimation, the fate of character is being reconstituted: problem and pathological gambling 





                                                          
1 There have thus far been few analyses linking the cultural phenomenon of gambling expansion to the 
sociological framework and themes of the “risk society” (Cosgrave 2006; Gephart 2001; Kingma 2004).  
2 Goffman was promoted to pit boss, and also played blackjack for his ethnographic work (See Fine et al. 
2000: xii; Treviano 2003: 31). 
3 Downes et al. 1976: 17.  The first chapter of the Downes book, “Gambling as a Sociological Problem”, 
remains one of the best sociological analyses of gambling to date.  
4 It is sociologically interesting to situate Goffman’s analysis of action in relation to Simmel’s (1971) 
phenomenology of adventure.  Goffman refers to Simmel’s essay in a footnote on p.162 (1967).  Gerhardt 
(2003) explores the analytical similarities between Simmel and Goffman, and provides as an example a 
discussion of the “style of presentation” of “Where the Action Is” (153-154).  Interestingly, while the piece 
is treated as a demonstration of Goffman’s interest in “forms of sociation,” there is no analytical connection 
between his formulation of action and risk and Simmel’s formulation of adventure. 
5 For a discussion of the Durkheimian influence on Goffman, see Burns’ (1992) excellent study of 
Goffman’s corpus of work.  See also Collins 1980; Chriss 1993; Rawls 2003.  For a reading of Goffman’s 
anxiety vis-à-vis Durkheim, see Travers 1999. 
6 On p.78, Lupton (1999) discusses Giddens’ notion of “fateful moments”, but there is no mention of 
Giddens’ borrowing of the notion of “fatefulness” from “Where the Action Is.”  See Goffman, 1967: 161-
170.  
7 In terms of risk management, casinos were the first to use biometric systems for surveillance, far ahead of 
law-enforcement agencies, airport security, and mainstream business (Schwartz 2003: 216-217).  
8 Beck has been pessimistic on this point: “The overarching feature of this epoch (of risk societies) is not a 
physical one, the looming destruction, but a social one, the fundamental, almost universal, and scandalous 
failure of institutions in the face of destruction” (1995: 85).  See also Beck 2003. 
9 The rational calculation of probabilities that provides certain profits (revenues) through the long odds of 
large-scale lotteries and the guaranteed “house edge” of various casino games (blackjack, roulette, etc.), 
demonstrates government-run gambling to be a form of providential coping. 
10 See, “Fate, Risk and Security” in Giddens, 1991: 109-143.  Giddens also draws upon Goffman’s concept 
of “Umwelt” (“accomplished ‘normalcy’”), p.127.   
11 In a footnote to her piece “On the Edge: Drugs and the Consumption of Risk in Late Modernity,” Gerda 
Reith (2005, p.243) provides a rebuttal to Lyng’s position, making a case for viewing gambling as 
edgework. 
12 The Goffmanian interest in “encounter” could be used as a resource to consider the stimulation derived 
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